The Efficiency of Pension Menus and Individual Portfolio Choice in 401(k) Pensions
Ning Tang, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary Mottola, and Steve Utkus In the US, 401(k) plans now represent the majority of tax-deferred company-based retirement saving programs. Almost 50 million active participants hold assets worth over $2 trillion in these plans Investment Company Institute, 2009) , and 401(k) plans will increasingly represent the primary source of retirement funding for a substantial fraction of retirees (Poterba, Venti and Wise 2007) . Accordingly, it is important to explore what options are commonly offered and chosen in 401(k) plans today, to help plan sponsors evaluate plan menus and also to assess portfolio choices made by participants.
How individual pension portfolios perform depends on two factors: the menu designed by plan sponsors, and the portfolio elections made by participants. In the US, plan sponsors are required by the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act to offer their employees investment options with 'appropriate risk and return' features, and also to monitor these options to ensure that they continue to be appropriate. Notwithstanding recent interest in plan design, there is little evidence on whether the menus offered are efficient. Two older studies suggested that some employers offer unduly restrictive investment choice sets which could depress returns and undermine the chances that employees can actually achieve market tangency portfolios with the best Sharpe ratios. For instance, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (hereafter EGB, 2006) examine 417 smaller plans surveyed by Moody's Investor Service in 2001; after reviewing the menus, they concluded that participants in those plans would have 53 percent less terminal wealth after two decades, compared to having held a market portfolio. A second study focused on only a subset of TIAA-CREF funds offered by employer plans in the higher education sector; that article claimed that, over a 40-year period, a participant in these plans might forgo over half their final wealth compared to an expanded menu (Angus, Brown, Smith, and Smith 2007) .
Nevertheless, in recent years, plan sponsors have greatly expanded the range of choices offered in 401(k) investment menus, so it is essential to revisit the question of menu choice and participant behavior using a larger and more recent dataset.
Even if plan menus were designed to offer participants the range of market instruments, the fact remains that workers are responsible for selecting their own portfolios from the menu offered. Some prior studies have found that individual investors in 401(k) plans seem to follow a naive allocation strategy (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Agnew, 2002) ; exhibiting inertia in asset allocation (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003) ; showing framing effects (Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov, 2007) ; displaying low levels of financial literacy and investment savvy (Hancock, 2002, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Van Rooij, Kool and Prast, 2007) ; overinvesting in company stock (Liang and Weisbenner, 2002; Huberman and Sengmueller, 2004) ; and following their peers (Duflo and Saez, 2002 ). Yet these studies do not directly address the question of whether participants are doing as well as they can, given the investment menus offered. In our own previous work, we assessed the performance of 401(k) trading behavior (Yamaguchi, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus 2006) using risk-adjusted returns; EGB (2007) also compared the Sharpe ratios and excess risk-adjusted returns of portfolios formed by participant investment weights, with alternative portfolios formed by a naive (1/N) allocation strategy. But no prior study has compared the losses that might be attributable to inefficient menu offerings versus those due to poor individual investment choices. This is the task we undertake in the present paper.
To preview our findings, we show that the overwhelming majority of 401(k) plans examined do offer efficient investment menus, compared to market benchmarks. Furthermore, a savvy investor can do quite well in terms of mean-variance efficiency and diversification.
Nevertheless, real-world participants fall down, since even in an efficient plan, they fail to invest and diversify well enough, as measured by return losses and idiosyncratic risk shares. These mistakes mount up, accounting for over three-quarters of the total losses sustained in an average portfolio. Indeed, actual investment patterns yield even worse results than what would be obtained using a naive allocation strategy. Finally, we show that, instead of simply adding funds to a plan menu, it is preferable to design a smarter menu and get participants to select the right set of fund choices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. After describing the data, we turn to an assessment of both plan and individual portfolio efficiency. Next we investigate factors that influence portfolio performance and plan efficiency. A final section summarizes and concludes.
I. Empirical Setting
The information we use is collected from 401(k) plans managed by the Vanguard mutual fund company, on behalf of a wide range of plan sponsors; here we use information on both plans and individual participants. Plan-level data include both the number and type of investment choices offered, total assets under management, numbers of accounts, 1 plan type, 2 and the monthly total return for each fund (12/97-12/04 Table 1 here Summary statistics on the plan characteristics appear in Table 2 . Plan assets average $73 million, with an average of 1,222 participants per plan. Domestic equity funds dominate the menus, with an average share of 19 percent in index funds and up to 28 percent in actively managed (AM) funds; also funds include (in decreasing order): AM balanced funds, money market funds, AM international equity funds, index bond funds, AM bond funds, index international equity funds, index balanced funds and other funds.
Table 2 here
Prior research has suggested that, as plans added funds over the years, the fraction of equity options has grown and most of the newly-added funds have been actively-managed (Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner 2007) . This could potentially be costly to participants if the index funds were less expensive and outperformed high-cost actively managed funds. In Figure 2 we array the funds in our sample according to the number of menu options. It is clear that, as the total number of funds rises, domestic equity funds do indeed become more prevalent. In addition, actively managed funds are more prevalent than index funds, when more choices are offered; and domestic equity dominates in both AM funds and index funds. Table 3 here
Individual fund choices appear in Figure 3 . There is a notable correlation between the fund options offered and selected. This may be due to the "naive allocation" patterns documented by Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and Agnew (2002) , who argued that people simply divide their money equally across all investment choices (1/N). Alternatively, plan sponsors may be offering the investment options that participants demand. There is also some evidence of overinvestment in company stock: that is, there is a much higher share of company stock chosen than offered. It is also worth noting that domestic equity funds and AM balanced funds dominate individual portfolios. Lastly, participants are more likely to choose actively managed instead of index funds except in the case of bonds. This may be partly due to the recent growth of actively managed balanced funds.
Figure 3 here
Overall, these findings are comparable to larger fund universe. We also use one international equity index MSCI EAFE and one international bond index JP Morgan Global Government Bond Non-US$. Finally, the one-month T-bill is taken as risk-free interest rate. 13 We evaluate whether adding any of the eight market benchmark indexes to each plan's tangency portfolio of funds would significantly improve the portfolio return at a given level of risk. Under this test, there are short sale constraints for both funds in a plan and market benchmark index. Specifically, for each plan, we run the regression:
where t i r , is the excess return of the ith benchmark index (i=1,2…8), t R refers to excess returns of subset of funds held by a plan where short-sale constraints are not binding, 14 The specific test statistic is:
where  is an 8*1 vector of estimated Jensen's alphas. For the critical value used in the test, we adopt the lower/upper bounds suggested by Kodde and Palm (1986) and run 1000 simulations to see if the test statistic falls within the critical value bounds.
Our results indicate that 94 percent, or 940 of the 1,003 plans studied, are efficient compared to market benchmarks, by the efficiency criterion described above. This implies that 401(k) plan participants can do as well as if they were investing in the capital market at large, by choosing an optimal portfolio in their efficient 401(k) plans. It is important to point out that even plans with few choices on the menu can still be as efficient as the benchmark. Inasmuch as mutual funds can span a combination of two or more market benchmark indexes, even few investment offerings can serve participants well -as long as the choices offered are sensible ones.
We explore this point further in next section.
Our finding of virtual complete 401(k) plan menu efficiency differs from the less positive finding in EGB's (2006) older study. Several factors may account for this difference. First, the EGB sample plans are far less diversified than are ours: for instance, only 71 percent plans in the EGB sample offered domestic bond funds, 81 percent plans had domestic mix (balanced) funds, 75 percent plans had international funds, and 87 percent had interest-only (money market) funds.
Our set of plans is much more diverse, as indicated in Table 1 . Second, our plans are far likely to offer bond funds (71 percent in EGB vs. 97 percent in our sample), which also enhances plan efficiency. Third, our data are taken from plans offered at the end of 2004, while the EGB data were drawn from 2001. The recent rapid growth in the mutual fund market may explain their better menus today.
Relative Sharpe Ratio Loss. We also compute the relative Sharpe ratio loss (RSRL) which compares the Sharpe ratio of a given portfolio with that of a benchmark portfolio. This measures the extent of economic loss from holding an inefficient portfolio in the mean-variance framework (Calvet, Campbell and Sodini 2006) . In our case, the portfolio to be measured is the tangency portfolio of funds under each plan. The benchmark portfolio is the tangency portfolio formed by the eight market benchmark indexes introduced in earlier. Thus for portfolio p, the relative Sharpe ratio loss is defined as: (3), we can see that the lower the ratio, the closer are the two Sharpe ratios; in other words, this implies a better plan performance relative to the benchmark portfolio.
The first row of Table 4 provides the distribution of relative Sharpe ratio losses of the tangency portfolio formed by available funds in each plan. Overall, the 401(k) plans in our analysis sample perform very well compared to the benchmark portfolio: the mean relative Sharpe ratio loss of 0.03 is quite low. In other words, the Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio of an average plan is 97 percent of that of the benchmark portfolio. Furthermore, the sample plans vary little in terms of their relative Sharpe ratio losses: even at the 90th percentile, the measure is only 0.05. A small residual of plans does not perform very well, which boosts the 99 th percentile of the measure to 0.66.
Table 4 here
Idiosyncratic Risk Share. Next we examine idiosyncratic risk share measures, or the share of portfolio total variance attributable to idiosyncratic risk out. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the risk that can be diversified away; therefore it measures a portfolio's undiversified risk (Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2006) . Specifically:
, where
is the idiosyncratic risk of tangency portfolio of funds held by the plan, and p  is the total risk of the tangency portfolio. So the lower the ratio, the better is the performance of a given plan.
The distribution of idiosyncratic risk share across our sample is displayed in the second row of 
III. Testing for Individual Investment Efficiency
Next we assess the efficiency of individual participants' investment efficiency given the Total Return Loss. The concept of "return loss" speaks to the return shortfall experienced by a participant's actual portfolio, given his choice of risk level, compared to the highest return that he could have been achieved in the broader capital market (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2006) .
Assume that a participant in plan j chooses a portfolio p with risk level p  . The monthly total return loss for his portfolio is: ) ( 
Figure 4 here
The first panel in Figure 5 shows the distribution of the monthly total return loss for 
Figure 5 here
Relative Return Loss. The total return loss above measures the total loss due to both participant investment choice inefficiency and plan menu restrictions. To distinguish between these sources of inefficiency, we next calculate the relative return loss which reflects only the inefficiency resulting from poor participant investment choices given plan menus. We do so by computing the best return obtainable in plan j for risk level p  or is B  in equation (5), keeping all other factors constant. That is, we calculate the return shortfall of each actual individual portfolio compared to the best return that could be obtained in the same plan for the same risk level. Thus line segment B in Figure 4 reflects the relative return loss before weight adjustment p w in equation (6), where the interior curve is the efficient frontier formed by funds available in a plan.
The distance between segments A and B measures the inefficiency caused by menu restrictions.
The second graph in Figure 5 reports the distribution of monthly relative return losses for the same participants; here we see that these losses are concentrated around a monthly mean loss of 0.079 percent. This monthly relative return loss would imply 21 percent less retirement wealth after a 20-year period. Again there is a distribution: some 6 percent of the participants have a return loss of zero, but 1 percent of participants experience a return loss of over 0.29 percent per month. Thus we conclude that few plan participants actually select an optimal portfolio from the menu offered to them, and a subset will lose a great deal, having failed to make wise investment choices. On average, the relative return loss from participant investment mistakes accounts for three quarters (76 percent) of the total return loss, indicating that participant portfolio choice inefficiency is the main source of underperformance.
Idiosyncratic Risk Share. Next we turn examine the idiosyncratic risk share of an individual's portfolio, defined as the ratio of idiosyncratic risk to the portfolio's total variance. Figure 6 displays the distribution of this measure, and it shows that the mean value of the idiosyncratic risk share is 0.187, a value much higher than the level that could be optimally achieved in a plan (it has a mean of 0.03 as shown in Table 4 ). Again there is a wide range from 0.001 to 0.997; also the top 5 percent of participants has an idiosyncratic risk share of more than 0.77, meaning that 77 percent of the portfolio variance is not rewarded by higher expected return. In other words, the idiosyncratic risk share evidence indicates that participants do not satisfactorily diversify their 401(k) plan portfolios.
Figure 6 here
Actual Portfolio vs. Naive Allocation Strategy. Because of this opportunity to evaluate actual participant portfolios, we can also determine whether participants do better than simply following a naive allocation strategy such as the simple "1/N" approach described above, which equally weights all funds offered (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Agnew, 2002) . To do so, we evaluate the relative return loss and idiosyncratic risk share of a hypothetical participant in each plan who follows a naive allocation strategy and compare it to the actuals just described. Results appear in Figure 7 , which confirm that actual individual portfolios underperform even the naive allocation strategy: they have higher relative return losses (0.079 percent vs.0.076 percent) and much higher idiosyncratic risk shares (0.187 vs. 0.04). This reinforces our conclusion that participants do not invest as efficiently as they could in their 401(k) plans. Prior studies have shown that actively managed funds underperform index funds (Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2007) , but that work did not evaluate actual participant portfolio performance.
We fill this gap by investigating whether there are significant differences between index versus actively managed funds, using the following multivariate regression function:
where i refers to the individual participant, and j refers to the plan. Dependent variables
Perform , refer to the portfolio relative return losses as well as idiosyncratic risk share calculated previously. To eliminate unobserved plan fixed effects, j Plan , we transformation the data as follows: Demo , respectively. Table 5 shows results of estimating equation (7); dependent variables in the two columns are, respectively, relative return losses in percentage, and idiosyncratic risk share.
The results show that choosing more funds does not much curtail return losses, although it can improve portfolio diversification. Inasmuch as most 401(k) assets are mutual funds (funds of assets), it is possible that a single mutual fund could span the portfolio formed by several individual assets. For this reason, participants should not strive to diversity across all funds in the portfolio for its own sake. Second, all the funds, except for international equity actively managed and balanced equity index funds, outperform the domestic equity index funds in terms of return losses. Bond funds help to improve the performance most. This means that in addition to holding domestic equity funds like most participants do today, holding bond funds, also make sense.
Third, index domestic funds improve portfolio diversification level most, so they are good choices in terms of portfolio diversification. Fourth, index funds do not dominate actively managed funds in every respect: although index funds help improve portfolio diversification more than do actively managed funds (except international equity funds), they do not persistently outperform actively managed funds in terms of return loss. Table 5 here Finally, we find that younger and more financially sophisticated with web access or higher income participants or those with more non-retirement wealth have lower return losses.
In addition, the younger people and people with more non-retirement wealth, but less income and no web access, have more diversified portfolios. These results are consistent with Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2006) who show that richer people choose more diversified portfolios while older people do not, but we differ in that Sweden that richer and more educated Swedish households bear higher costs from portfolio inefficiency as measured by return loss. This might be due to differences in financial literacy between Swedish and US 401(k) households.
In sum, we conclude that participants do try to diversify their portfolios, but this does not insure they end up with an efficient portfolio mix inside their 401(k) plans.
Menu Effects. To determine what menu design factors might influence plan efficiency, next we run regressions of the form: 19 A second vector of explanatory variables PLANCHAR is used to control for plan characteristics such as plan size (measured by ln accounts, ln 401(k) plan assets, 20 and contribution source). We also control on PRTCHAR which captures participant characteristics such as age, sex, plan tenure, and income as well as asset indicators -some of which are correlated with financial sophistication (ln non-retirement financial wealth, ln household income, home ownership, and web access). Table 6 shows the results of these multivariate models, where the first is a Probit regression on plan efficiency, and the other two are OLS regressions on the relative Sharpe ratio loss and idiosyncratic risk share. The evidence suggests that simply having more funds on the menu does not improve plan efficiency, although it can curtail the relative Sharpe ratio loss and idiosyncratic risk share. The magnitudes are small compared to the effect of other factors such as availability of certain funds. For example, the "number of funds" variable has a negative coefficient of -0.004, the magnitude of which is much lower than the coefficient on availability of index and actively managed bond funds (-0.13 and -0.05). The marginal benefit from adding more options is also decreasing, as indicated by the concave relationship between the number of options and plan performance. This is a striking finding, especially considering the current trend of plan sponsors to expand plan menus seeking to better serve participants. Since a single mutual fund contains different assets, having even a handful of these in the menu can achieve substantial diversification. Accordingly, plan sponsors should not merely load more funds onto the menu in the hopes of increasing plan efficiency.
The conclusion is further confirmed by Figure 8 . 21 It shows the average relative Sharpe ratio loss and idiosyncratic risk share calculated earlier, for plans arrayed by the number of funds they offer in their menus. Overall, the two measures are very low, indicating good plan performance. When a plan has more than nine funds, the measure becomes quite stable. Thus adding more funds does not improve the relative Sharpe ratio loss or idiosyncratic risk share much after this point. Table 6 and Figure 8 here
In Table 6 , we also find that specific kinds of funds have the largest positive effect in improving menu efficiency. Including index bond funds, for instance, is beneficial for efficiency;
conversely, balanced and actively managed international equity funds hurt plan efficiency during this period. Last, we find that adding index domestic equity funds also improves plan efficiency, not the case for actively managed domestic equity funds.
Considering the economic cost of adding more funds and the potential loss participants might bear from facing complicated menus, it may be better for plan sponsors to devote attention to fund selection, to enhance influence plan performance. Previously we noted that plan sponsors have increased the number of actively managed domestic equity funds over time, but our evidence suggests that this should not be done in the name of plan efficiency. And it is better to add funds that make the menu more efficient, rather than simply making the menu longer.
V. Conclusions and Implications
We have used a rich new dataset to explore what options are commonly offered and elected in modern US 401(k) plans, with the goal of evaluating investment menus offered by plan sponsors and portfolio choices selected by participants. We also seek to identify determinants of portfolio efficiency and to outline what can be done to enhance it. On the positive side, virtually all the plans we examine are efficient compared to the benchmark; this means that the plan sponsors can be applauded for offering sensible menus in terms of meanvariance efficiency and diversification. On the negative side, we find that participants err by investing inefficiently and not diversifying enough. Such mistakes can be important, producing one-fifth less retirement wealth in a 20-year period. Participants' failure to pick the best portfolio from the investment options offered to them account for the bulk of their poor performance.
Therefore this offers room for better-designed default options which employees might be moved into in an autoenrollment framework (Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi, 2009 ).
Although we focus here mainly on behavior in individual retirement accounts, our research has implications for portfolio choice and wealth outcomes more generally. Today almost half of all Americans have at least some assets in a tax-deferred account, and asset allocations are quite similar inside and outside tax-deferred accounts (Bergstresser and Poterba 2004 
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